CANCER RESEARCH & PANDORA'S BOX

Heu, contra principia negantem non est disputandum.

1. ACCESS & EGRESS

Cancer Research UK (2007-2010): Mr. David Newbigging, Chairman of the Council of Trustees; Mr. Harpal Kumar, Chief Executive.

[Duty, n.: moral or legal obligation. Ensure, vt.: make safe or sure; make sure to happen; secure. Investigation, n.: searching inquiry for ascertaining (relevant) facts in context; detailed or careful examination. Systematic, adj.: marked by regularity. Systemic weakness: one that is judged to be a fundamental problem that requires corrective action through administrative, regulatory, legislative, or policy change.]


5th March 2007. A risk-assessment correctly identifies that the swing-action of a main door is a potentially serious hazard to members of the general public, volunteers, and employees; a suggested permanent safety measure is approved and signed by the Shop Manager (Ms. Amy Logan), and then placed in the shop's Health & Safety File. As the embedded filmed simulation above shows all too graphically, this swing-action would seriously injure all but the most robust and agile adult and would kill a toddler.

6th March 2007. Shop Manager fails to action this risk-assessment; and, indeed, fails each week hereafter.

{The Health and Safety at Work Act etc 1974 states: "It shall be the duty of every employer to conduct his undertaking in such a way as to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that persons not in his employment who may be affected thereby are not thereby exposed to risks to their health or safety."}

5th July 2007. Area Manager (Ms. Trish McIlhoney) fails to notice, during a formal shop visit in concert with the Shop Manager [see Formal Shop Report no. 41827, headed "H&S Audit"], this inactioned risk-assessment in the shop's Health & Safety File; and, indeed, fails each informal visit hereafter.

8th July 2007. Resignation of (former) Weekend Shop Assistant.

19th July 2007. Shop Manager fails to action — within the two-week time scale — two safety measures specified by the Area Manager [see FSR no. 41827, headed "H&S Audit"]; and, indeed, fails each week hereafter.

20th July 2007. Area Manager fails to ensure that these two specified safety measures have been actioned; and, indeed, fails each week hereafter.

10th Aug. 2007. Shop Manager starts two-week holiday.

11th Aug. 2007. (New) Weekend Shop Assistant (Dr. Roger Peters), working alone, starts first day in post.

29th Jan. 2008. Area Manager fails to notice, for a second time, during a formal shop visit in concert with the Shop Manager [see FSR no. 41828], this inactioned risk-assessment in the shop's Health & Safety File; and, furthermore, also fails to notice that two urgent safety measures specified on the preceding page of the Formal Shop Report Book have not been actioned by the Shop Manager [see FSR no. 41827, headed "H&S Audit"].

7th April 2008. Shop Assistant's first contact — in whatever form — from his Line-Manager (Area Manager Ms. McIlhoney) since before his interview in August 2007.

September 2008. Promotion of the Shop Manager to Area Relief Manager recommended by the Area Manager and approved by the Regional Manager (Ms. Julie Byard).

6th Oct. 2008. Shop Assistant, on his routine day of volunteering (Monday), explicitly draws the Area Manager's attention to the presence of this inactioned risk-assessment in the shop's Health & Safety File during the course of his Performance & Development Review.

7th Oct. 2008. Area Manager fails to action this risk-assessment; and, indeed, fails each week hereafter.

22nd Oct. 2008. Shop Assistant sends confidential letter by recorded delivery to the Retail Health & Safety Manager (Mr. Steve Learmouth).

5th Nov. 2008. Safety Auditor (Mr. Jim Holyhead) fails to notice, during a formal compliance audit [see Health and Safety Audit 2008/2009 ("Area Manager: T. McIlhoney")], either this inactioned risk-assessment in the shop's Health & Safety File or the lacunae in statutory maintenance.

{The Health and Safety at Work Act etc 1974 states: "Without prejudice to the generality of an employer's duty under the preceding subsection, the matters to which that duty extends include in particular — (d) so far as is reasonably practicable as regards any place of work under the employer's control, the maintenance of it in a condition that is safe and without risks to health and the provision and maintenance of means of access to and egress from it that are safe and without such risks;"}

19th Nov. 2008. Shop Assistant sends confidential letter — entitled "Implementation of Acts of Parliament" — by recorded delivery to the Chairman of the Council of Trustees and the Chief Executive.

20th Nov. 2008. Area Manager fails to notice, for a third time, during a formal shop visit in concert with the (recently promoted) Area Relief Manager [see FSR no. 41829 & no. 418230], this inactioned risk-assessment in the shop's Health & Safety File.

{CR-UK's document entitled Our Approach to Confidential Reporting (A "Whistleblowing" Policy) states: "You should use this policy if you have a genuine concern that there are reasonable grounds that any of the following has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur: [...] a failure to comply with legal obligations, an endangerment to an individual's health and safety,"} ® Hence the following submissions.

3rd Dec. 2008. Shop Assistant sends confidential letter — entitled "Systemic Weaknesses Regarding Implementation of Acts of Parliament" — by recorded delivery to the Chairman of the Council of Trustees, the Chief Executive, and the Interim Director of Internal Audit (Mr. Bhavani Jois), together with a discussion document.

3rd Dec. 2008. Shop Assistant's copy to the Interim Director of Internal Audit attached with prima facie evidence of
«irregularities»; in particular, the following précis together with a photocopy of the 21-month inactioned risk-assessment.

"In March 2007, the conscientious (part-time) stock processor identified that the swing-action of one of the doors at the front of the shop was a potentially serious hazard to colleagues and the public; her suggested (permanent) control measure was signed and approved by the shop manager on 5th March 2007. No action was taken by either the shop manager or the area manager (despite the latter's frequent informal visits to the shop and also her «formal shop visits»), from March 2007 until October 2008.

On 6th October 2008, during the course of my annual appraisal, I drew my area/line manager's attention to this aforementioned hazard; she undertook to address the matter. No action has been undertaken, from this date to the present.

[...] November 2008, the shop had its (annual?) safety-financial audit; the safety auditor did not identify this hazard or the outstanding risk assessment.

Thus, from March 2007 to the present (December 2008), neither the shop manager, nor the relief manager(s), nor the area manager, nor the regional manager (by default), nor the safety auditor, nor the Retail Health & Safety manager (by default) have resolved this hazard. Should anyone — including, and in particular, young children or senior citizens — be seriously injured from the swing action of this door, then CRUK would be prosecuted by HSE and each of these individuals would be personally liable."

15th Dec. 2008. Shop Assistant sends confidential letter — together with additional prima facie evidence of «irregularities» — by recorded delivery to the Interim Director of Internal Audit.

9th Jan. 2009. Trading Director (Mr. Simon Ledsham) — who, hitherto, had had no communication with the Shop Assistant — writes [1]: "The door has been inspected and was found to be slamming shut due to a strong closure mechanism. Whilst not deemed to be a health and safety issue ..."

9th Jan. 2009. Citing the Head of Health and Safety (Mr. Kevin Thurlow) — who, equally, had had no communication with the Shop Assistant — the Trading Director also writes: "In his opinion the issues raised are not as a result of systematic failures and that CR-UK is meeting its obligations under the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 and other subordinate legislation."

9th Jan. 2009. Trading Director also writes: "Cancer Research UK takes Health and Safety very seriously ..."

16th Jan. 2009. The door, which is a means of access to and egress from the shop, whose uncontrolled swing-action would seriously injure all but the most robust and agile adult and would kill a toddler, has its broken safety mechanism replaced: ... 22 months after the original risk-assessment.

{The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, in force from 6th April 2008, states: "An organisation to which this section applies is guilty of an offence if the way in which its activities are managed or organised — (a) causes a person's death, and (b) amounts to a gross breach of a relevant duty of care owed by the organisation to the deceased."}

26th Jan. 2009. Trading Director resumes in writing [1]: "I would reiterate I am confident that our health and safety processes and practices are 'fit for purpose' and I do not support your view that there are systemic weaknesses."

24th Aug. 2009. Shop Assistant dismissed.

27th Aug. 2009. Chief Scientist (Professor Sir David Lane) writes: "Thank you for your e-mail of 26th August 2009 regarding your recent dismissal and the safety of the swing door."

[Co-recipients of this e-mail were the Chairman of the Council of Trustees (Mr. David Newbigging), the Chief Executive (Mr. Harpal Kumar), the Chief Clinician (Professor Peter Johnson), a former Interim Executive Director (Professor Herbie Newell), and the Executive Director, Fundraising & Supporter Marketing (Mr. Richard Taylor).]

February 2010. Despite integrity and excellence being supposèd core values of Cancer Research UK, no investigation has been initiated by either their Executive Board or their Council of Trustees [
2] to determine: the appropriateness of the conduct of Internal Audit [3]; the ostensible rationale for the assertions of the Head of Health & Safety and the Trading Director; the organisational root cause(s) of this 22-month «incident» [4,5,6]; or possible design flaws in the particular safety mechanism of such a swing-door [7].

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2. ELECTRICAL & FIRE SAFETY : 4pp.

3. DIVERSE SAFETY : 10pp.

4. DATA PROTECTION & HUMAN RIGHTS : 6pp.

5. VOLUNTEER CARE : 7pp.

6. HIERARCHAL BREACHES OF CONFIDENTIALITY : 11pp.

7. HIERARCHAL MISINFORMATION, DISINFORMATION & PARALOGISMS: Introduction : 12pp.

8. PROFLIGACY : 13pp.; document in progress.

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[Notes]

1. Verbatim transcription included in Document 7f.


2. CR-UK's Council of Trustees (2007-2010): Mr. David Newbigging (Chairman), Dr. Melanie Lee (Deputy Chairman), Professor Colin Bird, Professor Sir Kenneth Calman, Dr. Philip Campbell, Sir James Crosby, Ms. Liz Hewitt, Mr. Roger Matthews, Dame Bridget Ogilvie, Dr. Keith Palmer, Ms. Leah Sowden, Professor Jeffrey Tobias.


3. CR-UK's document entitled Our Approach to Confidential Reporting (A "Whistleblowing" Policy) states: "If you raised the concern with Internal Audit directly, they will complete [part A of] the [Confidential Reporting Form] using the information you provide." [Part A — Notification of Irregularity/Malpractice; Part B — Investigation of Reported Irregularity/Malpractice]


4. CR-UK's document entitled Our Approach to Dignity at Work states: "[...] We will not condone, tolerate or ignore any form of [...] unacceptable behaviour in our [...] employment practices. [...] Those in managerial roles have a responsibility to promote and implement the principles of this policy ..." [De jure and de facto, such employment practices must include implementing the spirit and the letter of, amongst other Acts of Parliament, the Health and Safety at Work Act etc 1974.]


5. CR-UK's document entitled Organisation and Responsibilities for Health & Safety within Cancer Research UK states: "[The] responsibilites [of any person with managerial authority or supervisory responsibility] include [...] investigating accidents and incidents [...], to establish root causes and introduce measures to prevent recurrence."


6. In another context: ... peer-reviewers in the scientific establishment would, justifiably, take an extremely dim view of research executed in a workplace where there had been a 22-month inactioned risk-assessment of, say, a cultured cell line or other potential biohazard.


7. Incidentally, prudence and common sense both demand that — whenever a safety mechanism fails — one should attempt to determine the reason(s) why the mechanism failed.

Dr. R. Peters'
Home Page.

[February 2010]