CANCER RESEARCH & PANDORA'S BOX

Sed, dum vita est, spes est.

8. PROFLIGACY

[Cancer Research UK's own promise in the 2008 Christmas Appeal reads: "Every penny you give will be spent effectively, with the maximum amount possible going directly into our vital research."]


I. A First (Unorthodox) Introduction;
«Hostages to fortune»

{The Chief Executive's Health, Safety and Welfare Policy Statement (March 2007) states: "The Council of Cancer Research UK attaches the greatest importance to safeguarding the health, safety and welfare of all persons at work"; ... note the use of the superlative adjective in this phrase.

Cancer Research UK's Volunteer Application Form (2007) states: "Cancer Research UK abides by the Data Protection Act."}

Please consider the following timeline — in just one of Cancer Research UK's 600 or so workplaces.


Displacement of main Health & Safety Notice in favour of shop's Sales Target Notice.

5th July 2007. Shop Manager (Ms. Amy Logan) in post 11 months.

5th July 2007. Area Manager (Ms. Trish McIlhoney), following a formal shop visit in concert with the Shop Manager [see FSR no.
41827, headed "H&S Audit"], specifies in writing: "Fire drills to be implemented within two weeks" and "Step Ladder to be obtained with correct B.S. [British Standard]".

5th July 2007. Area Manager fails to notice, during this same formal shop visit, the anomalies in completed Young Person's Risk Assessment Forms [see proforma], the totally aberrant placement of the main Health & Safety Notice [see sketch], a 4-month inactioned risk-assessment of the swing-door in the shop's Health & Safety File, a 2-month unreported accident in the Safety Book, the de facto ornamental nature of the fire extinguishers, the total unsuitability of the fire evacuation point [], the lack of provision for the safe temporary storage of broken glassware and sharps, the communal storage of food and shop cleaning chemicals, the lack of basic hygiene in the kitchen and toilet, exemplified by the antediluvian use of communal towels and non-functioning hand air-dryers, the non-alphabetical ordering of the volunteers' health details in the event of an emergency, and the non-implementation of the Data Protection Act []; and, indeed, fails each informal visit hereafter.

[† One that requires the individual — regardless of his or her mobility — to walk some 30 metres up a very steep slope.]

[‡ Specifically: by failing to secure any personal data of past or present employees, of past or present volunteers (including, and in particular, legal minors), or of innumerable past customers; and by failing to destroy unnecessary personal data.]

{Principle 5 of the Data Protection Act 1998 requires that: "Personal data processed for any purpose or purposes shall not be kept for longer than is necessary for that purpose or those purposes."

Principle 7 of the Data Protection Act 1998 requires that: "Appropriate technical and organisational measures shall be taken against unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal data and against accidental loss or destruction of, or damage to, personal data."}

20th July 2007. Area Manager fails to ensure [
1] that the two aforementioned safety measures specified have been actioned; and, indeed, fails each week hereafter.

10th Aug. 2007. Shop Manager starts two-week holiday.

11th Aug. 2007. (New) Weekend Shop Assistant (Dr. Roger Peters), working alone, starts first day in post.

12th Aug. 2007 (Sunday). Without prior warning, the Shop Assistant's duties unexpectedly include the sole supervision of a legal minor executing a Duke of Edinburgh Award — in a workplace replete with multiple breaches of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 and wherein there is non-implementation of the Data Protection Act 1998.

21st Jan. 2008. Shop Assistant, on his routine day of volunteering (Monday), in the presence of an independent witness, formally expresses his disapproval to the Shop Manager of her (almost daily) placement of a «free box» immediately outside the shop, and requests — with particular reference to the safety of young children amongst the general public — that such boxes should not contain glassware, sharps, or small objects.

29th Jan. 2008. Area Manager fails to notice, during a formal shop visit in concert with the Shop Manager [see FSR no.
41828], the continuing anomalies in completed Young Person's Risk Assessment Forms [see proforma], the totally aberrant placement of the main Health & Safety Notice [see sketch], the 10-month inactioned risk-assessment of the swing-door in the shop's Health & Safety File, her own 6-month inactioned safety measures specified on the preceding page of the Formal Shop Report Book [see FSR no. 41827, headed "H&S Audit"], the 8-month unreported accident in the Safety Book, the lack of provision for the safe temporary storage of broken glassware and sharps, the de facto ornamental nature of the fire extinguishers, the total unsuitability of the fire evacuation point [], the lacunae in Portable Appliance Testing, the communal storage of food and shop cleaning chemicals, the lacunae in COSHH assessments, the lack of basic hygiene in the kitchen and toilet, exemplified by the antediluvian use of communal towels and non-functioning hand air-dryers, the non-alphabetical ordering of the volunteers' health details in the event of an emergency, and the continuing non-implementation of the Data Protection Act; and, indeed, fails each informal visit hereafter.

5th Feb. 2008. The Legal, Human Resources, Health & Safety, and Retail Departments, the Safety Committee, the Data Protection Supervisor (Ms. Diane Scott), the Human Resources Director (Mr. John Macey), the Head of Health & Safety (Mr. Kevin Thurlow), the Trading Director (Mr. Simon Ledsham), the Retail Health & Safety Manager (Mr. Steve Learmouth), and the Regional Manager (Ms. Julie Byard) — all from afar — fail to ensure that the Data Protection Act is being implemented and that there are no anomalies in completed Young Person's Risk Assessment Forms, no inactioned risk-assessments, no inactioned safety measures, no lacunae in statutory safety provision and maintenance, and no volunteer welfare concerns; and, indeed, fail each week hereafter.

{The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 state: "Every employer shall make and give effect to such arrangements as are appropriate, having regard to the nature of his activities and the size of his undertaking, for the effective planning, organisation, control, monitoring and review of the preventive and protective measures."

The document entitled Organisation and Responsibilities for Health and Safety within Cancer Research UK states: "Management • All employees who are responsible for the management of other staff, [...], have a direct responsibility for the implementation of Cancer Research UK's policy on health and safety and welfare. This responsibility cannot be delegated,"}

2nd April 2008. Shop Assistant forcefully recommends to the Shop Manager, in the presence of an independent witness, to adopt diverse remedial safety and data protection measures.

7th April 2008. Shop Assistant's first contact — in whatever form — from his Line-Manager (Area Manager Ms. McIlhoney) since before his interview in August 2007; ... i.e., 8 months after his appointment.

Summer 2008. Shop Manager fails to implement consistently the remedial measure recommended on 2nd April for the safe temporary storage of broken glassware and sharps [see plan of workplace].

4th Sept. 2008. Training Development Officer (Ms. Debbie Bradley) — who had failed to notice the totally aberrant placement of the main Health & Safety Notice [see sketch] and who had previously certified that the Shop Manager had completed CR-UK's Health & Safety / Manual Handling Training Course [see proforma] — signs the «perfect score» of the Shop Manager's Level Two Completion Review Form [see CRV]; ... the «topics» of Health & Safety and Data Protection are distinguished by their absence on this form.

8th Sept. 2008. Shop Assistant, on his routine day of volunteering (Monday), forcefully recommends to the Shop Manager, in the presence of an independent witness, to adopt further remedial safety and data protection measures.

8th Sept. 2008. Shop Manager, in the presence of the same independent witness, states: "I didn't think that Cancer Research had to follow the Data Protection Act."

8th Sept. 2008. Subsequently, this same independent witness shows the Shop Manager a copy of the Volunteer Application Form [2], repeatedly distributed by the Shop Manager since her appointment in late-July 2006, wherein is stated: "Cancer Research UK abides by the Data Protection Act."

September 2008. Promotion of the Shop Manager to Area Relief Manager recommended by the Area Manager and approved by the Regional Manager, who — continuing from afar — fails to seek any verifiable information on their managerial competence regarding the implementation of the Health & Safety at Work and Data Protection Acts.

29th Sept. 2008. Shop Assistant sends letter — «bristling with red flags» — by recorded delivery to the Data Protection Supervisor, which includes the following three suggestions.

"First, each employee is personally provided with a copy of the aforementioned (common sense) principles. Second, each manager, whether they be shop-based or home-based, should identify a suitably-sized secure location for the deposition of such data (cf. principle 7). And third, each manager should acquire a cross-cutting shredder — so that all unnecessary data are thoroughly destroyed (cf. principle 5)."

6th Oct. 2008. Shop Assistant, on his routine day of volunteering (Monday), provides the Area Manager with her first copy of the eight principles of the Data Protection Act.

22nd Oct. 2008. Shop Assistant sends
confidential letter — «bristling with red flags» — by recorded delivery to the Retail Health & Safety Manager: ... who fails to initiate an investigation into the letter's essential substance.

5th Nov. 2008. Safety Auditor (Mr. Jim Holyhead), at the conclusion of a formal compliance audit — partially conducted in the presence of an Area Relief Manager (Ms. Logan), formerly Shop Manager — gives a «score» of 44/51 [see extract of Health and Safety Audit 2008/2009 ("Area Manager: T. McIlhoney")].

13th Nov. 2008. Retail Learning & Development Manager (Ms. Lynn Paulo) effectively implies in a memo that Health & Safety training for new — but actively practising — managers is less important than training for Merchandising & Display and Stock Control.

19th Nov. 2008. Shop Assistant sends confidential letter — «bristling with red flags» — by recorded delivery to the Chairman of the Council of Trustees (Mr. David Newbigging) and the Chief Executive (Mr. Harpal Kumar): ... who fail to initiate an investigation into the letter's essential substance.

20th Nov. 2008. Area Manager, during a formal shop visit in concert with the (recently promoted) Area Relief Manager [see FSR no. 41829 & no. 418230], writes: "Visit to go over compliance and H&S with Relief Manager."

20th Nov. 2008. Area Manager fails to notice, during this same formal shop visit, these outstanding safety issues: the 20-month inactioned risk-assessment of the swing-door in the shop's Health & Safety File; her own 16-month inactioned requirement to obtain a step ladder with the correct British Standard, specified in the Formal Shop Report Book [see FSR no. 41827, headed "H&S Audit"]; the discrepancy between the retesting date (April 2009) on Elecheck's Formal Safety Report and that on their tested electrical items (April 2010); the de facto ornamental nature of the fire extinguishers; the absence of weekly portable fire extinguisher testing [see Fire Safety Book p. 34]; the Shop Assistant's 6-month inactioned recommendation for a safer and more convenient fire evacuation point for those of maturer years or with decreased mobility [see FSB p. 32]; the absence of fire evacuation drills for two long-serving volunteers; the lack of basic hygiene in the kitchen and toilet, exemplified by the antediluvian use of communal towels and non-functioning hand air-dryers; and the non-alphabetical ordering of the volunteers' health details in the event of an emergency.

27th Nov. 2008. Chairman of the Council of Trustees writes: "[We] are currently undertaking a data protection audit which extends to the retail shop operations ..."

[Note: firstly, that the number of CR-UK customers dwarfs that of volunteers; secondly, that the number of CR-UK volunteers dwarfs that of full-time and part-time employees in the organisation; and thirdly, that the duty of data protection — throughout an organisation — had been enshrined in law for ten years.]

3rd Dec. 2008. Shop Assistant, continuing the steadfast fulfilment of his statutory and contractual obligations, sends second confidential letter — «bristling with red flags» — by recorded delivery to the Chairman of the Council of Trustees and the Chief Executive, together with a discussion document — entitled "Systemic Weaknesses Regarding Implementation of Acts of Parliament" — which includes the following sentences.

"Young persons — i.e., those lads and lasses under 16 — represent one of the two vulnerable sections of CRUK's volunteer base (the other being senior citizens); and, as such, CRUK's duty of care must be beyond reproach.

[The] Safety Committee should accept, without delay and without qualification, my judgement that all the following are unfit for purpose: management supervisory practices; safety audits; formal shop visits; safety culture; and safety training.

In my view, the relevant committee(s) should accept, without delay and without qualification, the interim [technical and organisational] measures I suggested in the letter dated 29th September [to the Data Protection Supervisor], before addressing the necessary development of a rigorous auditing/supervisory process."

9th Jan. 2009. Citing the Head of Health and Safety, the Trading Director — who, hitherto, had had no communication with the Shop Assistant and, therefore, had none of the verifiable information in context — writes: "In his opinion the issues raised are not as a result of systematic failures and that CR-UK is meeting its obligations under the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 and other subordinate legislation."

18th Jan. 2009. Shop Assistant, in an e-mail to the Chairman of the Council of Trustees, the Chief Executive, the Executive Director of Fundraising & Supporter Marketing (Mr. Richard Taylor), the Interim Director of Internal Audit, and the Trading Director, writes:

"I [...] assert that «CRUK's safety training is not fit for purpose»: CRUK's hierarchy, supported by an "independent professional", assert the contrary.

Now, in order to be allowed to drive a car safely and legally on the road: one takes a highway-code course, then one's theory proficiency is assessed; subsequently, one takes a suite of driving lessons, then one's practical proficiency is assessed. Since time immemorial, and for very good reason, assessment follows training [...].

Setting aside the method of delivery, the fundamental reason why «CRUK's safety training is not fit for purpose» is the absence of assessment: so absolutely no one has the vaguest notion of anyone's proficiency in any given topic at any given time.

Now, having established the falsity of this particular example of received wisdom, one must attempt to remove the hitherto obscured [systemic] weakness — perhaps along the following (inexpensive and straightforward) lines [...]."

26th Jan. 2009. Trading Director resumes in writing: "I would reiterate I am confident that our health and safety processes and practices are 'fit for purpose' and I do not support your view that there are systemic weaknesses."


October 2009. Queen's Counsel Charles Haddon-Cave, in The Nimrod Review (Stationery Office, Norwich, Ordered by The House of Commons to be printed 28th October 2009), writes:

"A Questioning Culture is the key to a true Safety Culture. In my view, people and organisations need constant reminding of the importance of asking questions rather than making assumptions, of probing and testing rather than assuming safety based on past success, of independent challenge of conventional wisdom or shibboleths, of the exercise of judgment rather than retreat behind the assignment of arbitrary quantitative values. [Paragraph 27.29]

Questioning is a catalyst for thinking. As Professor McDermid told me, if he could replace all of the regulations with one word it would be: "THINK". Thinking can often be painful, difficult and not always immediately productive. It is, of course, much easier and quicker to make convenient assumptions, or slavishly follow procedure or tick boxes. [Paragraph 27.30]

Many of these lessons and truths may be unwelcome, uncomfortable and painful; but they are all the more important, and valuable, for being so. It is better that the hard lessons are learned now, and not following some future catastrophic accident. [Paragraph 29.6]

Tragically, for the crew of [the RAF Nimrod MR2 Aircraft] XV230, the lessons have come too late, and at an infinite price. The most fitting memorial to the loss of the crew of XV230 [on 2nd September 2006] will be that the lessons from their sacrifice are truly learned, and the Recommendations which I have set out are fully implemented. [Paragraph 29.7]"

Self-evidently, the foregoing provides not the slightest degree of evidential support for either the assertion that "The Council of Cancer Research UK attaches the greatest importance to safeguarding the health, safety and welfare of all persons at work" or the assertion that "Cancer Research UK abides by the Data Protection Act."

{The document entitled Organisation and Responsibilities for Health and Safety within Cancer Research UK states: "The Council of Cancer Research UK have the ultimate responsibility for the health, safety and welfare of all Cancer Research UK employees. The Chief Executive and the Directors exercise this responsibility on Council's behalf."}

[Cancer Research UK Council of Trustees (2007-2010): Mr. David Newbigging (Chairman), Dr. Melanie Lee (Deputy Chairman), Professor Colin Bird, Professor Sir Kenneth Calman, Dr. Philip Campbell, Sir James Crosby, Ms. Liz Hewitt, Mr. Roger Matthews, Dame Bridget Ogilvie, Dr. Keith Palmer, Ms. Leah Sowden, Professor Jeffrey Tobias.]

{The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 states: "An organisation to which this section applies is guilty of an offence if the way in which its activities are managed or organised — (a) causes a person's death, and (b) amounts to a gross breach of a relevant duty of care owed by the organisation to the deceased."}

II. A Second (Unorthodox) Introduction;
«There, for want of a nail, go I»

First, consider a father and his 3-year-old son, ... or yourself and your 3-year-old son.

Should the son be killed by an unavoidable accident, the father would experience intense grief resulting from the desolating realization that his son would never be able to further enrich his own life. As time unfolded, the father's intense grief would slowly decrease — in part by his (reluctant) acceptance that unavoidable accidents do occur, and in part by his intermittent reflections upon those permanent enrichments of his own life bestowed by his late son.

In agonizing contrast, should the son pay the infinite price by an avoidable accident — for example, and in particular, by the swing-action of a Cancer Research UK main door with a broken slow-release safety mechanism, for which an unequivocally correct and documented risk-assessment had been executed 21 months previously [
3] — the father's intense grief would be beyond measure and lifelong when he becomes aware that, throughout this period — albeit without malice aforethought — at least 50 legally and morally obligated individuals,

namely, amongst others, the Council of Trustees, the Executive Directors, the Audit Committee, the Safety Committee, the Health & Safety Department, the Interim Director of Internal Audit, the Head of Health & Safety, the Trading Director, the Retail Health & Safety Manager, a Safety Auditor, a Regional Manager, an Area Manager, an Area Relief Manager, and a Shop Manager,

would have done absolutely nothing to ensure the life of his priceless son: ... I repeat, absolutely nothing.

{The document entitled Organisation and Responsibilities for Health and Safety within Cancer Research UK states: "Management • All employees who are responsible for the management of other staff, [...], have a direct responsibility for the implementation of Cancer Research UK's policy on health and safety and welfare. This responsibility cannot be delegated,"}

5th July 2007. Area Manager, following a formal shop visit in concert with the Shop Manager [see FSR no. 41827, headed "H&S Audit"], specifies in writing: "Fire drills to be implemented within two weeks" and "Step Ladder to be obtained with correct B.S. [British Standard]".

29th Jan. 2008. Area Manager fails to notice, during a formal shop visit in concert with the Shop Manager [see FSR no. 41828], the 10-month inactioned risk-assessment of the swing-door in the shop's Health & Safety File, and her own 6-month inactioned safety measures specified on the preceding page of the Formal Shop Report Book [see FSR no. 41827]; and, indeed, fails each informal visit hereafter.

5th Feb. 2008. Regional Manager — from afar — fails to ensure that there are no inactioned risk-assessments or inactioned safety measures; and, indeed, fails each week hereafter.

2nd April 2008. Shop Assistant, in the presence of an independent witness, forcefully recommends that the Shop Manager conducts the first fire drill since before her appointment 20 months previously [see Fire Safety Book p. 32].

14th April 2008. Shop Assistant, on his routine day of volunteering (Monday), directs a fire drill and, immediately thereafter, signs a recommendation for a safer and more convenient fire evacuation point for those of maturer years or with decreased mobility [see FSB p. 32].

September 2008. Promotion of the Shop Manager to Area Relief Manager recommended by the Area Manager and approved by the Regional Manager, who — continuing from afar — fails to seek any verifiable information on their managerial competence regarding the implementation of Cancer Research UK's policy on "health and safety and welfare": ... to which the Council of Trustees supposèdly attaches "the greatest importance".

22nd Oct. 2008. Shop Assistant sends
confidential letter — «bristling with red flags» — by recorded delivery to the Retail Health & Safety Manager, wherein he explicitly refers to the disregard of risk-assessment by three or more levels of management over a 20-month period.

5th Nov. 2008. Safety Auditor fails to notice, during a formal compliance audit, the 20-month inactioned risk-assessment of the swing-door, the Area Manager's 16-month inactioned requirement to obtain a step ladder with the correct British Standard, and the Shop Assistant's 6-month inactioned recommendation for a safer fire evacuation point for those of maturer years or with decreased mobility — ensconced in the shop's Health & Safety File, Formal Report Book, and Fire Safety Book, respectively.

19th Nov. 2008. Shop Assistant sends confidential letter — «bristling with red flags» — by recorded delivery to the Chairman of the Council of Trustees and the Chief Executive, wherein he explicitly refers to grave systemic weaknesses in Cancer Research UK's implementation of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974.

2nd Dec. 2008. Retail Health & Safety Manager fails to notice, during a formal shop inspection in concert with the Area Manager and the Area Relief Manager, the 21-month inactioned risk-assessment of the swing-door in the shop's Health & Safety File.

4th Dec. 2008. New Shop Manager obtains a step ladder with the correct British Standard; ... 17 months after the Area Manager's signed safety measure to the former Shop Manager, now Area Relief Manager.

4th Dec. 2009. Interim Director of Internal Audit fails to initiate the investigation necessitated by the Shop Assistant's prima facie evidence of multiple and prolonged breaches of statutory safety legislation; and, indeed, fails each week hereafter.

7th Jan. 2009. New Shop Manager introduces a safer and more convenient fire evacuation point for those of maturer years or with decreased mobility; ... 8 months after the Shop Assistant's signed recommendation to the former Shop Manager, now Area Relief Manager.

9th Jan. 2009. Trading Director writes: "Cancer Research UK takes Health and Safety very seriously ..."

16th Jan. 2009. The broken slow-release safety mechanism of the swing-door is replaced [4,5]: ... 22 months after the original risk-assessment — complete with the suggested permanent safety measure approved and signed — had been executed.

{The Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 states: "[The] matters to which that duty extends include in particular — (d) so far as is reasonably practicable as regards any place of work under the employer's control, the maintenance of it in a condition that is safe and without risks to health and the provision and maintenance of means of access to and egress from it that are safe and without such risks;"}

Furthermore, several of those individuals who would have accorded no dignity to his son's life would similarly accord no dignity to his son's death, either by opining demonstrably false assertions —

"[The] issues raised are not as a result of systematic failures and that CR-UK is meeting its obligations under the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 and other subordinate legislation." [Head of Health & Safety (9th Jan. 2009)],

"The door has been inspected and was found to be slamming shut due to a strong closure mechanism. Whilst not deemed to be a health and safety issue ..." [Retail Director (9th Jan. 2009)], and

"I would reiterate I am confident that our health and safety processes and practices are 'fit for purpose' and I do not support your view that there are systemic weaknesses." [Retail Director (26th Jan. 2009)] —

or by tacitly accepting such false assertions [ Interim Director of Internal Audit (4th Dec. 2008 onwards); Chairman of the Council of Trustees and Chief Executive (13th Jan. 2009 onwards); Chief Scientist, Chief Clinician, and Executive Director, Fundraising & Supporter Marketing (26th Aug. 2009 onwards)],

in contradiction to the undoubtedly wise precepts of Queen's Council Charles Haddon-Cave [loc. cit., Paragraph 27.26],

"An organisation that demonstrates a strong Learning Culture is willing to adapt and change based on safety indicators and hazards uncovered through assessments, data and incidents. [In a] 'learning' organisation, its employees and policies allow for continuous learning and improvements to safety through observation and evaluation. It does not consider it is the 'perfect place' and understands that there is no room for complacency. As Professor Reason points out, "if you think your organisation has a good safety culture, you are almost certainly mistaken".",

as well as to the undoubtedly correct judgement of Mr. Ian Whewell, (retired) Director of the Health & Safety Executive's Offshore Division [loc. cit., preface to Chapter 27],

"A company which has got a compliance culture, does not have a safe culture."

{The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 state: "Every employer shall ensure that young persons employed by him are protected at work from any risks to their health or safety which are a consequence of their lack of experience, or absence of awareness of existing or potential risks or the fact that young persons have not yet fully matured."}

Next, consider a father and his 14½-year-old daughter — who is executing the voluntary component of her Duke of Edinburgh Award in a Cancer Research UK workplace.

The father's implicit but fully justified expectations would be: firstly, that Cancer Research UK's guardians and seniormost stewards, the Council of Trustees and Executive Directors, respectively, would regard themselves as in loco parentis whenever the «apple of his eye» was in any of their workplaces — or scheduled to be so; secondly, that these guardians and stewards would have ensured that their Head of Health & Safety, Human Resources Director, and Data Protection Supervisor had implemented (near) fail-safe auditing mechanisms for ensuring her health, safety, welfare, and personal data; and thirdly, that — aside from a fairly precise understanding of the particular requirements of the voluntary component of the Award — her designated workplace supervisor would have critically assessed competence in health & safety and data protection.

None of these expectations would be realized: ... I repeat, none.

Furthermore, several of those individuals who would have accorded no dignity to his daughter's life would ...

{The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 state: "Every employer shall make and give effect to such arrangements as are appropriate, having regard to the nature of his activities and the size of his undertaking, for the effective planning, organisation, control, monitoring and review of the preventive and protective measures."}

29th Jan. 2008. Area Manager fails to notice, during a formal shop visit in concert with the Shop Manager [see FSR no. 41828], the lacunae in Portable Appliance Testing; and, indeed, fails each informal visit hereafter.

2nd April 2008. Shop Assistant forcefully recommends, in the presence of an independent witness, that the Shop Manager arranges for Portable Appliance Testing on all electrical items — including, and in particular, a second-hand fridge.

22nd April 2008. Elecheck conduct Portable Appliance Testing on all electrical items; only one item fails, namely the aforementioned fridge — because of failed insulation resistance.

22nd Oct. 2008. Shop Assistant sends confidential letter — «bristling with red flags» — by recorded delivery to the Retail Health & Safety Manager, wherein he explicitly refers to the disregard of risk-assessment by three or more levels of management over a 20-month period.

5th Nov. 2008. Safety Auditor fails to notice, during a formal compliance audit, these outstanding safety issues: the 20-month inactioned risk-assessment of the swing-door and the presence of an undated ex posto facto account of a cracked overhead-pipe in the shop's Health & Safety File; the lacunae in statutory maintenance; the Area Manager's 16-month inactioned requirement to obtain a step ladder with the correct British Standard, specified in the Formal Shop Report Book [see FSR no. 41827, headed "H&S Audit"]; the 12-month discrepancy between the Portable Appliance retesting date (April 2009) on Elecheck's Formal Safety Report — clearly in view in the workplace — and that on their tested electrical items (April 2010); the de facto ornamental nature of the fire extinguishers [6]; the 6-month absence of weekly portable fire extinguisher testing [see Fire Safety Book p. 34]; the Shop Assistant's 6-month inactioned recommendation for a safer and more convenient fire evacuation point for those of maturer years or with decreased mobility [see FSB p. 32]; the ≥ 30-month absence of fire evacuation drills for two long-serving volunteers; the lack of basic hygiene in the kitchen and toilet, exemplified by the antediluvian use of communal towels and non-functioning hand air-dryers; and the ≥ 30-month non-alphabetical ordering of the health details of volunteers in the event of an emergency.

19th Nov. 2008. Shop Assistant sends confidential letter — «bristling with red flags» — by recorded delivery to the Chairman of the Council of Trustees and the Chief Executive, wherein he explicitly refers to grave systemic weaknesses in Cancer Research UK's implementation of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974.

9th Jan. 2009. Trading Director — who, hitherto, had had no communication with the Shop Assistant and, therefore, had none of this verifiable information in context — writes:

"Currently Cancer Research UK is undergoing an overall review of all of Health and Safety requirements aimed to achieve best practice. This is led by the Executive Board and independently advised by external consultants. [...] I hope the content of this letter confirms the resolution of the issues and the commitment of the Charity to Health and Safety Management."

May 2009. Retail Property Manager, following a formal compliance audit in concert with a "Health and Safety consultant", writes: "PA Testing and records are up to date and correct."

[Note: Elecheck's Electrical Safety Report of 22nd April 2008 — clearly in view in the workplace — states that retesting should occur in April 2009.]

May 2009. Retail Property Manager also writes: "The stiff front door had been a serious issue."

[Note: firstly, the above statement's twofold inconsistency with the Retail Director's statement of 9th January 2009 — "The door has been inspected and was found to be slamming shut due to a strong closure mechanism. Whilst not deemed to be a health and safety issue ..."; secondly, both statements' contrariety with the evidence of the film and with the prima facie evidence submitted by the Shop Assistant to Internal Audit on 3rd December 2008; and thirdly, both statements' damning failure to include the date of the original risk-assessment — an indispensible requirement for any thorough safety investigation.]

11th Aug. 2009. Outstanding safety issues, aside from continuing systemic weaknesses, include: the 3-month overdue Portable Applicance Testing (déjà vu); the ≥ 41-month absence of fire evacuation drills for two long-serving volunteers — one of whom is a severely diabetic senior citizen with greatly decreased mobility; the lack of basic hygiene in the kitchen and toilet, exemplified by the antediluvian use of communal towels and non-functioning hand air-dryers; and the ≥ 41-month non-alphabetical ordering of the health details of volunteers — two of whom have severely compromised immune systems — in the event of an emergency.

22nd Aug. 2009. Associate Head of Retail Finance, in the presence of the LSF Regional Manager and a Human Resources Business Partner, states:

"Clearly he [the Shop Assistant] has frustrations about health and safety but everyone has frustrations in the work place."


October 2009. Queen's Council Charles Haddon-Cave states [loc. cit., Paragraph 20.15]:

"There must be strong leadership from the very top, demanding and demonstrating by example active and constant commitment to safety [as an overriding priority]."

{The Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 states: "It shall be the duty of every employer to conduct his undertaking in such a way as to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that persons not in his employment who may be affected thereby are not thereby exposed to risks to their health or safety."}

Next, consider a father and his mother — a senior citizen who is selflessly contributing as a volunteer in a Cancer Research UK workplace.

Should the mother be cerebrally damaged or killed by an unavoidable accident, the father would experience intense anguish or grief resulting from the desolating realization that his mother's ability to further enrich his own life would be reduced or extinguished. As time unfolded, the father's intense anguish or grief would slowly decrease — in part by his (inevitable) acceptance that unavoidable accidents do occur, and in part by his frequent reflections upon those permanent enrichments of his own life bestowed by his mother.

In bitter contrast, should the mother be cerebrally damaged or pay the infinite price by an avoidable accident — by any number of means, given the serious lacunae in a health and safety audit (
5th July 2007), the necessity for remedial safety measures (2nd April 2008 & 8th Sept. 2008), and the serious lacunae in a formal compliance audit (5th Nov. 2008) — the father's intense anguish or grief would be beyond measure and lifelong when he becomes aware that, throughout his or her guardianship or stewardship, at least 45 legally and morally obligated individuals,

namely, amongst others, the Council of Trustees, the Executive Directors, the Audit Committee, the Safety Committee, the Health & Safety Department, the Interim Director of Internal Audit, the Head of Health & Safety, the Trading Director, and the Retail Health & Safety Manager,

had given not a thought to the imposition — at every hierarchal level of Cancer Research UK — of assessed health & safety training or (near) fail-safe auditing mechanisms or a true safety culture: ... I repeat, not a thought.

Furthermore, several of those individuals who would have accorded no dignity to his lady mother's life would ...

Finally, please consider the paradox following this timeline.

{Cancer Research UK's document entitled Performance & Development Review — FSM Form — 2008-2009 states: "Our Core Values are: • Integrity — We have integrity. We approach everything we do with honesty and trust. • Excellence — We aim for excellence in both what we do and the way we do it."}

19th Nov. 2008 and 3rd Dec. 2008. Shop Assistant, continuing the fulfilment of his statutory, contractual, and moral obligations, sends "protected disclosures" — as defined in the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 — regarding the multiple, prolonged, and recidivistic breaches of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, the Data Protection Act 1998, and the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 — to the Chairman of the Council of Trustees and the Chief Executive.

{The Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 states: "In this Act a "protected disclosure" means a qualifying disclosure [... which] means any disclosure of information which, in the reasonable belief of the worker making the disclosure, tends to show one or more of the following —

(b) that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation to which he is subject,

(d) that the health or safety of any individual has been, is being or is likely to be endangered,"}

3rdth Dec. 2008 and 15th Dec. 2008. Shop Assistant sends "protected disclosures" to the Interim Director of Internal Audit, which include prima facie evidence of misconduct and/or gross misconduct [7] by several members of CR-UK's hierarchy: ... no investigations are initiated, despite the commitment stated in, and the inclusivity and raison d'être of, the Internal Code of Practice mentioned immediately below.

17th Dec. 2008. Chairman of the Council of Trustees, echoing CR-UK's document entitled Our Approach to Confidential Reporting (A "Whistleblowing" Policy), writes: "Please rest assured that nobody who, in good faith, raises genuinely held concerns that there is or may be be a failure to comply with legal obligations or an endangerment to an individual's health and safety will be dismissed or subjected to any detriment as a result of such action."

23rd Dec. 2008 to 20th Aug. 2009. Repeated — and, eventually, unbearably detrimental — intrusions of a plethora of misinformation, disinformation, and paralogisms — by unencrypted e-mail and/or letter — into the Shop Assistant's home by diverse members of CR-UK's hierarchy; namely, in chronological order, the Interim Director of Internal Audit, the Trading Director, the Regional Human Resources Advisor, an Area Relief Manager, an Area Manager, the Regional Manager, the Property Manager, a Human Resources Business Partner, and an Associate Head of Retail Finance.

{Article 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998 states: "Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence."}

[... Paradox ...]


III. A Third (Unorthodox) Introduction;
«Look after the pennies»

First, please consider the following timeline.

11th Aug. 2007. (New) Weekend Shop Assistant, working alone, starts first day in post.

12th Aug. 2007 (Sunday; a.m.). Without prior warning, the Shop Assistant's duties unexpectedly include the sole supervision of a legal minor executing a Duke of Edinburgh Award — in a workplace replete with multiple breaches of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 and wherein there is non-implementation of the Data Protection Act 1998.

12th Aug. 2007 (Sunday; p.m.). Shop Assistant identifies several systemic weaknesses [8] in Cancer Research UK's implementation of diverse Internal Codes of Practice and Acts of Parliament — including, and in particular, the Health and Safety at Work Act, the Data Protection Act, and the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999.

13th Aug. 2007. Shop Assistant, on his first routine day of volunteering (Monday), reports the obligatory «weekend figures»; ... a numerically illiterate, otiose, and profligate exercise.

August 2007 to December 2008. Shop Assistant identifies innumerable patent and latent examples of Cancer Research UK's inefficiencies, profligacy, and numerical illiteracy; ... but, judging the removal of the aforementioned systemic weaknesses to be infinitely more important [9], decides not to disclose any of these examples to Cancer Research UK's hierarchy.

7th April 2008. Shop Assistant's first contact — in whatever form — from his Line-Manager (Area Manager Ms. McIlhoney) since before his interview in August 2007; ... i.e., 8 months after his appointment.

25th Sept. 2008. Shop Manager receives penultimate monthly sales target bonus, immediately before taking up her new position as an Area Relief Manager with a purview of about 20 workplaces.

29th Sept. 2008 to 15th Dec. 2008. Shop Assistant sends "protected disclosures" — as defined in the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 — regarding the multiple, prolonged, and recidivistic breaches of the Data Protection Act, the Health and Safety at Work Act, and the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations — to the Data Protection Supervisor, the Retail Health & Safety Manager, the Chairman of the Council of Trustees, the Chief Executive, and the Interim Director of Internal Audit.

Each recipient fails to initiate an investigation into the essential substance of his or her letter(s) — much less initiate an investigation to determine the implications and the root causes of these breaches [10].

3rd Dec. 2008. Shop Assistant sends prima facie evidence of severe inefficiencies in Cancer Research UK's management, training, assessment, and auditing procedures to the Chairman of the Council of Trustees, the Chief Executive, and the Interim Director of Internal Audit.

Each recipient fails to initiate an investigation to determine the precise nature of these inefficiencies — much less initiate an investigation to determine the implications and the root causes of same.

6th Jan. 2009. Shop Assistant, in an e-mail to the Chairman of the Council of Trustees, the Chief Executive, the Interim Director of Internal Audit, and the Area Manager, writes:

"[...] I insist — in the first instance — that, by 27th January 2009*, you and Ms. Logan fulfil your legal obligations by identifying and resolving the three major outstanding safety issues. * Given that you and (the then Shop Manager) Ms. Logan considered it perfectly acceptable not to execute a fire-drill in twenty months — and then only because I forcibly demanded same [§] — a mere three week «period of grace» may appear over-demanding: but that is of no consequence whatsoever."

9th Jan. 2009. Each recipient of, and each co-respondent to, this e-mail fails to ask the Shop Assistant what these "three major outstanding safety issues" might be; and, indeed, fails each week hereafter.

6th Jan. 2009. Shop Assistant, in the very same e-mail, writes:

"Currently, CRUK's National Retail Centre wastes tens of thousands of pounds collecting meaningless figures. [...] However, unless you recognize this fact and write a formal written objection to the relevant individual(s), you too will be culpable of breaking CRUK's own promise stated in the 2008 Christmas Appeal: "Every penny you give will be spent effectively, with the maximum amount possible going directly into our vital research." Many other (severer) examples of CRUK's profligacy could be cited."

9th Jan. 2009. Each recipient of, and each co-respondent to, this e-mail fails to ask the Shop Assistant what these "(severer) examples of CRUK's profligacy" might be; and, indeed, fails each week hereafter.

24th Aug. 2009. Shop Assistant, on his last routine day of volunteering (Monday), customarily reports the obligatory «weekend figures»; ... a numerically illiterate, otiose, and profligate exercise.

[Number of phone calls per year collecting such figures nationally: ≥ 31,000 (weekly); ≥ 62,000 (biweekly); ≥ 93,000 (triweekly).]


IV.
[... ...]


V. Examples of Inefficiences & Profligacy

1. Transference of numerical, textual, and verbal data via external carriers (i.e., postal and telecommunication companies) or via «travel-expensed» locations, as a consequence of the absence of wi-fi enabled laptops, bar-code readers, and computerised cash-tills coupled to internet access for ≈ 550 of the ≈ 600 nodes of the CR-UK network/system.

2. Inordinate amount of administrative «busy work» as a consequence of ...; e.g., stock taking, completion of otiose or ill-designed forms, ...

3. Inevitable data compartmentalisation (and effective information loss) at nodes as a consequence of ...; e.g., unexpected or rare safety concerns or hazards [4], near misses [5], novel merchandising ideas, recycling problems, unwitting propagation of received wisdoms, ...

4. Absence of a convenient and potentially efficient training and (continual) assessment tool as a consequence of ...; e.g., ...

5. [... ...]


VI.
[... ≥ £n,000,000 ? ...]

[... ... ... Completion of Document in progess. ... ... ...]

________________________________________________________________________________

1. ACCESS & EGRESS : 4pp.

2. ELECTRICAL & FIRE SAFETY : 4pp.

3. DIVERSE SAFETY : 10pp.

4. DATA PROTECTION & HUMAN RIGHTS : 6pp.

5. VOLUNTEER CARE : 7pp.

6. HIERARCHAL BREACHES OF CONFIDENTIALITY : 11pp.

7. HIERARCHAL MISINFORMATION, DISINFORMATION & PARALOGISMS: Introduction : 12pp.

________________________________________________________________________________

[Notes]

1. Ad hominem argument: logical fallacy of attempting to undermine an individual's argument by attacking the individual instead of addressing the argument. Ad verecundiam argument: argument from titular authority. Antiphrase: phrase conveying the opposite meaning to the one intended literally. Compliance audit: comprehensive review of an organisation's adherence to statutory or internal regulations. Contradiction in terms: combination of words whose meanings are in conflict with one another. Disinformation: falsehood(s) by omission. Doublespeak: systematic and deliberate misuse of language for the purpose of deception. Duty: moral or legal obligation. Dysfunctional literacy: impaired comprehension skills; unwitting misuse of language. Dysfunctional morality: impaired ability to distinguish between right and wrong. Dysfunctional numeracy: impaired ability to use the basic tools of arithmetic to understand data. Ensure: make safe or sure; make sure to happen; secure. Functional illiteracy: inadequate reading and writing skills for ordinary practical needs. Groupthinking: type of thinking within a deeply cohesive in-group whose members try to minimize conflict and reach consensus without critically testing, analyzing, and evaluating. Hostage to fortune: act, commitment, or remark which is regarded as unwise because it invites trouble or could prove difficult to live up to. Investigation: searching inquiry for ascertaining (relevant) facts in context; detailed or careful examination. Misfeasance: inadequate or poor performance of a contractual duty. Misinformation: falsehood(s). Near miss: event in which an accident involving loss of life, property damage, environmental impact, or an operational interruption, could have resulted if circumstances had been slightly different. Nonfeasance: complete failure to perform a contractual duty. Numerical illiteracy: failure to know how to use the basic tools of arithmetic to understand data. Paralogism: illogical reasoning, the illogicality of which the reasoner in question is unware of. Platitude: trite or banal statement, especially one expressed as if it were significant and original. Remedial: designed or intended to correct or improve a deficiency in a specific attribute. Root cause: an initiating cause of a causal chain which leads to an outcome or effect of importance. Sinecure: position or office that requires little or no work but provides a salary. Sophistry: fallacious reasoning. Systematic: marked by regularity. Systemic weakness: one that is judged to be a fundamental problem that requires corrective action through administrative, regulatory, legislative, or policy change. Systems audit: extensive, reflective, and self-critical review of the efficacy and value of an organisation's structural network(s) from the perspective of systems theory.

2. Implementation of the Data Protection Act 1998 requires that each completed Volunteer Application Form should be placed in a secure location prior to its destruction using a cross-cutting shredder, and that each accompanying Diversity Monitoring Form should be securely transferred to the appropriate internal authority to ensure a complete data set is available for both compliance and systems auditing: ... none should be screwed up and shoved in a bin.

3. In another context: ... peer-reviewers in the scientific establishment would, justifiably, take an extremely dim view of research executed in a Cancer Research UK workplace where there had been a 21-month inactioned risk-assessment of, say, a cultured cell line or other potential biohazard.

4. Note that in the absence of an investigation into why the swing-door's safety mechanism broke, its replacement is merely a (necessary) remedial action for this particular workplace: ... so, with respect to other workplaces with these swing-doors, such represents an inexcusably squandered example of the learning opportunity provided by this «near miss» [5].

5. Former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker et al. write [H, p. 203]: "In the process safety context, the investigation of [...] near misses is especially important for several reasons. First, there is a greater opportunity to find and fix problems because near misses occur more frequently than actual incidents having serious consequences. Second, despite the absence of serious consequences, near misses are precursors to more serious incidents in that they may involve systemic deficiencies that, if not corrected, could give rise to future incidents. [Third, ...]."

6. Each «standard-sized» fire extinguisher is de facto ornamental if the individual legally responsible for safety — in any given workplace at any given time — has either not been trained and assessed in its use — as, indeed, required by the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 — or, through no fault of his or her own (e.g., lack of physical strength, arthritis, lack of self-confidence), is unable to «man-handle» such a physical beast.

From the foregoing, the health & safety legislation, logic, and common sense all demand that each individual legally responsible for safety must be: (a) trained and assessed in the use of «pocket-sized» extinguishers and fire blankets; and (b) provided with fairly precise written guidance as to the circumstances where fire-evacuation — rather than fire-fighting — procedures should be implemented.

7. CR-UK's document entitled Our Approach to Discipline states: "Misconduct: breach of CR-UK's working procedures, guideline, and policies; lack of proper care and attention to work; [...] Gross misconduct: serious infringement of health and safety rules; serious breach of CR-UK's working procedures, guideline, and policies; [...]."

8. Whilst the factor of human «frailties» is an essential one in systems theory, systemic weaknesses are typically attributable to lacunae or inefficacies in an organisation's structural networks and auditing mechanisms — as a consequence of insufficently extensive and reflective cognition.

9. The Management Shop Programme 2008 had workshops in the following order: 1. Merchandising and Display; 2. Stock Control; 3. (Non-assessed) Health & Safety; 4. Stock Management; 5. Cancer Research UK — Why We Exist; 6. Managing Shop Performance; 7. Volunteer Recruitment and Management.

However, if the "Council of Cancer Research UK attaches the greatest importance to safeguarding the health, safety and welfare of all persons at work",

then the health & safety and data protection legislation, logic, and common sense all demand these workshops in the following order: 1. Assessed Health & Safety; 2. Assessed Data Protection; 3. Volunteer Management; 4. Cancer Research UK — Why We Exist; 5. Merchandising and Display; 6. Stock Management & Control.

10. CR-UK's document entitled Organisation and Responsibilities for Health & Safety within Cancer Research UK states: "[The] responsibilites [of any person with managerial authority or supervisory responsibility] include [...] investigating accidents and incidents [...], to establish root causes and introduce measures to prevent recurrence."

[References]

A. C. Northcote Parkinson, Parkinson's Law: The Pursuit of Progress, John Murray, London, 1958.
B. Sir Ernest Gowers, The Complete Plain Words, (2nd edition revised by Sir Bruce Fraser), Penguin, London, 1977 (ISBN: 0140205542).
C. Lord Cullen, Report of The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster, HMSO, London, 1990 (ISBN: 010113102).
D. Donald J. Wheeler, Understanding Variation, SPC Press, Knoxville, 1993 (ISBN: 0945320353).
E. Fritjof Capra, The Web of Life, Harper Collins, London, 1997 (ISBN: 0006547516).
F. James Reason, Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents, Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, 1997 (ISBN: 1840141050).
G. Elizabeth Knowles (Ed.), The Oxford Dictionary of Phrase and Fable, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000 (ISBN: 0198602197).
H. James A. Baker III et al., The Report of the BP U.S. Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel, January 2007.
I. U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, Final Investigation Report, Refinery Explosion and Fire, BP, Texas City, Texas, March 23, 2005 (No. 2005-04-I-TXR), March 2007.
J. Charles Haddon-Cave QC, The Nimrod Review, The Stationery Office, Norwich, Ordered by The House of Commons to be printed 28th October 2009 (ISBN: 9780102962659).
K. Robert Francis QC, Independent Inquiry into Care Provided by Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust January 2005 – March 2009, The Stationery Office, London, Ordered by The House of Commons to be printed on 24 February 2010 (ISBN: 9780102964394).

Dr. R. Peters'
Home Page.

[July 2010]