CANCER RESEARCH & PANDORA'S BOX
Heu, contra principia negantem non est disputandum.
7. HIERARCHAL MISINFORMATION, DISINFORMATION & PARALOGISMS:
Introduction
[Leo Tolstoy wrote in What is Art?, 1898: "I know that most men, including those at ease with problems of the greatest complexity, can seldom accept even the simplest and most obvious truth if it be such as would oblige them to admit the falsity of conclusions which they have delighted in explaining to colleagues, which they have proudly taught to others, and which they have woven, thread by thread, into the fabric of their lives."]
I. (Author's premises) Each individual — whether he or she be a member of the general public, volunteer, employee, or whatever — has the inviolable right to dignity in a Cancer Research UK workplace; and each individual's dignity can only be respected and ensured by the rigorous and critically audited implementation of the relevant Acts of Parliament, by the identification and removal of systemic weaknesses, by completely respectful communication and management, and by effective guardianship.
II. An illustrative and self-contained timeline revealing systematic failures and systemic weaknesses in just one of Cancer Research UK's 600 or so workplaces, ... and alluding to the organisational root causes of same.
5th July 2007. Area Manager (Ms. Trish McIlhoney), following a formal shop visit in concert with the Shop Manager [see FSR no. 41827, headed "H&S Audit"], specifies in writing in the Formal Shop Report Book: "Fire drills to be implemented within two weeks" and "Step Ladder to be obtained with correct B.S. [British Standard]".
19th Nov. 2008. Shop Assistant (Dr. Roger Peters) sends a confidential letter — «bristling with red flags» — by recorded delivery to the Chairman of the Council of Trustees (Mr. David Newbigging) and the Chief Executive (Mr. Harpal Kumar): ... who fail to initiate an investigation into the letter's essential substance. |
III. The multiple, prolonged, and recidivistic breaches of, amongst other Acts of Parliament, the Health & Safety at Work and Data Protection Acts, as summarized in Documents 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, provide irrefutable evidence — at every hierarchal level within the organisation — of CR-UK's ignorance or misunderstanding of the worthwhile meaning of dignity, the primacy of duty of care [2], an engaged safety culture [3,4,5,6], statutory obligations and internal codes of practice [7,8,9], and systems theory [10], & of CR-UK's non-existent or lamentably inadequate training, assessment, management supervisory, investigative, and auditing procedures.
IV. Given that Acts of Parliament do not provide a carte blanche for a succession of inefficacious audits, belated and incomplete remedial measures, or platitudes of present or future good intent, such breaches are ignominious in themselves. But of infinitely greater concern to present and future employees, volunteers, members of the general public, and beneficiaries of CR-UK's hugely innovative but necessarily safety-protocolled research — aside from discriminatory practices [8,9], breaches of confidentiality [11], and profligacy [12] — must be the internal propagation by diverse members of CR-UK's hierarchy of a plethora of falsehoods, half-truths, ad verecundiam arguments [e.g., *], non sequiturs [e.g., ¶], antiphrases [e.g., §], and ad hominem arguments [e.g., •].
V. Whilst exemplars from this plethora are contained within Documents 1-6 and 8, such barely skim the surface of the misinformation, disinformation, and paralogisms propagated by diverse members of CR-UK's hierarchy exercising titular authority: ... as distinct from exercising genuine authority realized by cognition, by the correct use of language, by the acquisition of expertise, and by thorough investigation.
VI. In order to provide the reader with the true information in context, verbatim transcriptions of correspondence with these members of CR-UK's hierarchy are interleaved with «commentaries» and with relevant extracts of Acts of Parliament and Internal Codes of Practice within the framework of timelines and authoritatively defined words and phrases [13].
VII. A thorough understanding of these commentaries requires unequivocal acceptance of the author's premises, a reflective appreciation of the background to, and the quite extraordinary implications of, his personal fons et origo of 12th August 2007, and provisional acceptance of the following interlinked points.
A. CR-UK's document entitled Our Approach to Dignity at Work, hereafter referred to as the «Dignity at Work Code», might be suitably paraphrased as: «Cancer Research UK's Guardians — the Council of Trustees [14] — will not condone, tolerate or ignore any form of unacceptable behaviour in the Charity's employment practices; and each individual exercising a managerial rôle has an absolute moral imperative to promote and implement these latter conscientiously, as explicitly required in the Management section of Cancer Research UK's document entitled Organisation and Responsibilities for Health and Safety within Cancer Research UK, wherein is stated: "All employees who are responsible for the management of other staff, [...], have a direct responsibility for the implementation of Cancer Research UK's policy on health and safety and welfare. This responsibility cannot be delegated,"».
B. De jure and de facto, such employment practices — referring here to members of the general public, volunteers, and employees — must include implementing the spirit and the letter of, amongst other Acts of Parliament, the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, the Children Act 1989, the Human Rights Act 1998, the Data Protection Act 1998, the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999, the Part-time Workers Regulations 2000, and the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005.
C. Any individual within CR-UK's hierarchy — from the «humblest» to the «most august» — is breaking the «Dignity at Work Code» if he or she is not conscientiously and continually attempting to implement rigorously the relevant Act of Parliament, attempting to ensure the implementation of complementary (near) fail-safe auditing mechanisms for same, or keeping a weather eye open for inherent or acquired systemic weaknesses.
VIII. Given that the overwhelming majority of these breaches of Acts of Parliament were already of longstanding before the author's appointment on 11th August 2007, CR-UK's Executive Board and several Senior Management Teams have continuously breached the «Dignity at Work Code» from before this date, through his first contact — in whatever form — from his Line-Manager (Area Manager Ms. McIlhoney) on 7th April 2008, through his de facto constructive dismissal on 24th August 2009, up to (at least) March 2010.
IX. Deconstructing the aforementioned plethora is a trivial task: but mind-numbingly tedious to execute — not least because the «devil is often in the chronological detail». Similarly, the resulting deconstructions are equally tedious to read: and, one might justifiably assert, of decreased value unless they are complemented by constructive elements [15]. Accordingly, whenever justified, these latter are presented at appropriate points within either the commentaries or Document 8.
X. Finally, a caveat: ... as just the following extracts of four missives reveal all too clearly — and most dispiritingly — rationalism and CR-UK's hierarchy may well be «a bridge too far».
17th Dec. 2008. Chairman of the Council of Trustees writes: |
________________________________________________________________________________
1. ACCESS & EGRESS : 4pp.
2. ELECTRICAL & FIRE SAFETY : 4pp.
3. DIVERSE SAFETY : 10pp.
4. DATA PROTECTION & HUMAN RIGHTS : 6pp.
5. VOLUNTEER CARE : 7pp.
6. HIERARCHAL BREACHES OF CONFIDENTIALITY : 11pp.
7. HIERARCHAL MISINFORMATION, DISINFORMATION & PARALOGISMS:
[Deconstructions — in progress (*) or in preparation.]
7a. Ms. T. McIlhoney (Area Manager; & Line-Manager, from 11th August 2007 to 1st December 2008) : 6pp.* |
8. PROFLIGACY : 13pp.; document in progress.
________________________________________________________________________________
[Notes]
1. Ad hominem argument: logical fallacy of attempting to undermine an individual's argument by attacking the individual instead of addressing the argument. Ad verecundiam argument: argument from titular authority. Antiphrase: phrase conveying the opposite meaning to the one intended literally. Disinformation: falsehood(s) by omission. Doublespeak: systematic and deliberate misuse of language for the purpose of deception. Duty: moral or legal obligation. Dysfunctional literacy: impaired comprehension skills; unwitting misuse of language. Ensure: make safe or sure; make sure to happen; secure. Functional illiteracy: inadequate reading and writing skills for ordinary practical needs. Investigation: searching inquiry for ascertaining (relevant) facts in context; detailed or careful examination. Misfeasance: inadequate or poor performance of a contractual duty. Misinformation: falsehood(s). Nonfeasance: complete failure to perform a contractual duty. Paralogism: illogical reasoning, the illogicality of which the reasoner in question is unware of. Platitude: trite or banal statement, especially one expressed as if it were significant and original. Remedial: designed or intended to correct or improve a deficiency in a specific attribute. Root cause: initiating cause of a causal chain which leads to an outcome or effect of importance. Sophistry: fallacious reasoning. Systematic: marked by regularity. Systemic weakness: one that is judged to be a fundamental problem that requires corrective action through administrative, regulatory, legislative, or policy change.
2. The misinformation, disinformation, and paralogisms propagated by Human Resources Business Partner Ms. Newton and Human Resources Director Mr. Macey will be systematically and thoroughly deconstructed in Documents 7k and 7m, respectively: but the following timeline alone reveals a damning ignorance or misunderstanding of the minimum requirement necessary to effect even a rudimentary level of duty of care.
10th Aug. 2007. Shop Manager (Ms. Amy Logan) starts two-week holiday. |
3. For two illuminating and salutary works, see Professor James Reason's study entitled Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, 1997; ISBN 1840141050) and Queen's Counsel Charles Haddon-Cave's official report entitled The Nimrod Review (The Stationery Office, Norwich, 2009; ISBN 9780102962659) — in particular Chapter 27, entitled New Safety Culture, which is prefaced by the following statement of Ian Whewell, Director of the Health & Safety Executive's Offshore Division: "A company which has got a compliance culture, does not have a safe culture."
4. The misinformation, disinformation, and paralogisms propagated by Associate Head of Retail Finance Ms. White will be systematically and thoroughly deconstructed in Document 7l: but the following timeline alone reveals an irredeemingly damning indictment of the disengaged safety culture of Cancer Research UK's hierarchy.
{The Chief Executive's Health, Safety and Welfare Policy Statement reads: "The Council of Cancer Research UK attaches the greatest importance to safeguarding the health, safety and welfare of all persons at work"; ... note the use of the superlative adjective in this phrase.}
{The Health and Safety Information for Employees Regulations 1989 state: "An employer shall, in relation to each of his employees: (a) ensure that the approved poster is kept displayed in a readable condition — (i) at a place which is reasonably accessible to the employee while he is at work, and (ii) in such a position in that place as to be easily seen and read by that employee;"}
6th Oct. 2008. Shop Assistant also draws the Area Manager's attention to the presence of the inactioned risk-assessment of the swing-door in the shop's Health & Safety File [see film]; she undertakes to address the matter. |
5. Lord Cullen, Report of The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster (HMSO, London, 1990; ISBN 010113102), writes: "[The establishment of a safety culture
includes the] systematic identification and assessment of hazards and the devising and exercise of preventative systems which are subject to audit and review."
6. Charles Haddon-Cave QC, loc. cit., writes:
"A Questioning Culture is the key to a true Safety Culture. In my view, people and organisations need constant reminding of the importance of asking questions rather than making assumptions, of probing and testing rather than assuming safety based on past success, of independent challenge of conventional wisdom or shibboleths, of the exercise of judgment rather than retreat behind the assignment of arbitrary quantitative values.
Questioning is a catalyst for thinking. As Professor McDermid [of the University of York] told me, if he could replace all of the regulations with one word it would be: "THINK". Thinking can often be painful, difficult and not always immediately productive. It is, of course, much easier and quicker to make convenient assumptions, or slavishly follow procedure or tick boxes."
7. For a standard reference work, see Allan St.John Holt's & Huw Andrews' Principles of Health and Safety at Work (ISOH Publishing, Leicester, 1993; 2nd Edition ISBN 0901357170).
8. The misinformation, disinformation, and paralogisms propagated by Interim Director of Internal Audit Mr. Jois will be systematically and thoroughly deconstructed in Document 7e: but, given,
firstly, the spirit and the letter of the Data Protection Act 1998, the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, and the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999,
secondly, the substance of the Shop Assistant's confidential submissions of 3rd and 15th December 2008,
thirdly, the spirit and the letter of CR-UK's document entitled Our Approach to Confidential Reporting (A "Whistleblowing" Policy), and
fourthly, CR-UK's document entitled Our Approach to Discipline, states "Misconduct: • breach of CR-UK's working procedures, guidelines and policies; • lack of proper care and attention to work. Gross Misconduct: • serious infringement of health and safety rules; • serious breach of CR-UK's working procedures, policies or guidelines;",
it is irrefutable that the Interim Director had sufficient prima facie evidence to initiate formal investigations into probable misconduct by the Data Protection Supervisor, the Head of Health & Safety, the Trading Director, and the Safety Auditor, and into probable misconduct and gross misconduct by the Retail Health & Safety Manager, the Regional Manager, the Area Manager, and the Area Relief Manager (former Shop Manager).
9. The misinformation, disinformation, and paralogisms propagated by LSF Regional Manager Ms. Bedford will be systematically and thoroughly deconstructed in Document 7l: but the following timeline alone reveals not only the damnable value of these but also a damning ignorance or misunderstanding of statutory obligations and internal codes of practice.
10th Aug. 2007. Shop Manager (Ms. Amy Logan) starts two-week holiday. |
10. For a gentle introduction to, and a «bird's-eye-view» of, systems theory, see Fritjof Capra's The Web of Life (Harper Collins, London, 1996; ISBN0006547516) — in particular Chapters 3 & 4.
11. See Document 6.
12. See Document 8.
13. Cf., Lewis Carroll, loc. cit.: "When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less."
14. CR-UK's Council of Trustees (2007-2010): Mr. David Newbigging (Chairman), Dr. Melanie Lee (Deputy Chairman), Professor Colin Bird, Professor Sir Kenneth Calman, Dr. Philip Campbell, Sir James Crosby, Ms. Liz Hewitt, Mr. Roger Matthews, Dame Bridget Ogilvie, Dr. Keith Palmer, Ms. Leah Sowden, Professor Jeffrey Tobias.
15. For example, the reader might be forgiven for thinking that the following summary
5th Nov. 2008. Safety Auditor (Mr. Jim Holyhead) fails to notice, during a formal compliance audit [see Health and Safety Audit 2008/2009 ("Area Manager: T. McIlhoney")] — partially conducted in the presence of an Area Relief Manager (Ms. Logan), formerly Shop Manager — these outstanding safety issues: the 20-month inactioned risk-assessment of the swing-door [see film] and the presence of her undated ex posto facto account of the cracked overhead-pipe in the shop's Health & Safety File; the lacunae in statutory maintenance; the Area Manager's 16-month inactioned requirement to obtain a step ladder with the correct British Standard, specified in the Formal Shop Report Book [see FSR no. 41827, headed "H&S Audit"]; the discrepancy between the retesting date on Elecheck's Formal Safety Report (April 2009) and that on their tested electrical items (April 2010); the de facto ornamental nature of the fire extinguishers; the absence of weekly portable fire extinguisher testing [see FSB p. 34]; the Shop Assistant's 6-month inactioned recommendation for a safer and more convenient fire evacuation point for those of maturer years or with decreased mobility [see FSB p. 32]; the absence of fire evacuation drills for two long-serving volunteers; the lack of basic hygiene in the kitchen and toilet, exemplified by the antediluvian use of communal towels and the non-functioning hand air-dryers; and the non-alphabetical ordering of the volunteers' health details in the event of an emergency. |
is merely a vehicle for (unconstructive) illustrations of CR-UK's nonfeasance and misfeasance: ... but nothing could be farther from the truth. Thus, the failures are — in substantial measure — attributable to three inherent systemic weaknesses: lacunae in the Health & Safety Audit Proforma and in management supervisory procedures coupled to Cancer Research UK's disengaged safety culture (note the caveats by Mr. Ian Whewell and Professor John McDermid).
16. Incidentally, several lacunae in the «syllabus» of CR-UK's "Health and Safety Training Programme", during the period 2006 to 2009, become all too evident on reading the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 and Acts cited therein.
Dr. R. Peters' Home Page.
[March 2010]